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The objective of this analysis is to determine the movements (long-term trend) of the 
exchange rate by looking at the rate of return and risk that financial assets (3-month T-bills) 
have in four different economies, for four different investors. Risk averse speculators will try to 
maximize their return and minimize risk by investing in different countries, and these capital 
flows will affect the value of the four currencies (their exchange rates). The empirical results 
show that before 2001 the return in the U.S. was high and the dollar was appreciated; after 
2001, the same return became negative and the dollar was depreciated, but after 2004 the 
returns have growing positively for the U.S. and relatively the same for the U.K.; the returns for 
the Euro-zone and Japan are falling. So, the dollar is expected to appreciate, the pound might 
experience a little appreciation and the euro will fall together with the yen. From this ex post 
analysis, we can conclude that, by forecasting risk and return in countries’ assets, we can 
determine the long-term trend of these currencies (exchange rates) in the future. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
In Europe, on January 4, 1999, the official launch for the single European currency 
(“euro”) took place at the introductory rate of 1.1668 $/euro. Eleven European Union member 
states elect to participate in this new system; Greece joined the Euro group in 2001. Three years 
later, on January 1, 2002, euro coins and notes were introduced in the EU-12 (Euro-zone). The 
euro’s value slid steadily following its introduction and reached the value of 0.8813 $/euro on 
December 31, 2001. Beginning in early 2002, the euro started a strong and steady rise in value, 
peaking at 1.3646 $/euro on December 30, 2004. After January 2005, the euro is slowly 
depreciated and became 1.2126 $/euro at the end of January 2006.1 Today, it has become a 
popular reserve currency, representing 19.7% of central bank holdings.2 Apart from issues of 
exchange rate risk and deeper capital markets, the euro has had bad record of success with regard 
the growth, the employment, the exports, the investments, the inflation, the loss of monetary 
policy for the EMU member-states, and its disapproval by the average European citizen.  
In the U.S.A., years of large current account deficits, enormous national debt,3 high real 
return on U.S. assets, and relatively low risk have left the United States with the world’s largest 
stock of international liabilities. By the end of 2004, foreign net claims on the U.S. amounted to 
$2.5 trillion, equivalent to 22% of U.S. GDP.4 This tremendous demand for U.S. assets was 
expected to appreciate the U.S. dollar relative to euro and the other foreign currencies, but data 
show exactly the opposite. Then, other factors might have affected the exchange rate between the 
dollar and the other major currencies, like speculation5 and uncertainty for the future, due to the 
Middle East crises (Palestinians and Israelis, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel’s invasion in Lebanon, and 
the creeping ones in Iran, Syria, and North Korea). It is well established that the volatility of 
exchange rates6 displays considerable persistence. That is, large movements in spot rates tend to 
be followed by more large movements later, which increasing risk and producing serial 
correlation in real returns. Thus, past and present volatility can be used to predict future volatility 
and the forward discount or premium of the different currencies. Investors in foreign assets must 
pay attention not only to the expected return from their investment activity, but also to the risk 
that they incur.7 Risk averse investors try to reduce their exposure during periods of high 
volatility by predicting the return of their investment and the volatility (variance) of this return. 
This volatility has been forecasted with GARCH (p, q) models8 or genetic programs,9 which give 
broadly similar results. Investors will invest in assets denominated in a currency that its return 
                                                           
1 See, Kallianiotis (2006b, Table 2). 
2 See, Eiteman, Stonehill, and Moffett (2007, p. 55). 
3 The outstanding national debt was $8.535 trillion on September 13, 2006 (www.brillig.com). 
4 See, Higgins, Klitgaard, and Tille (2005, p. 1).  
5 Speculators (actually, sordid gainers and profiteers) in the oil industry have cause uncertainty in the global 
economy, too. Some call them “white collar terrorists”. Exxon Mobil Corp., the world’s biggest oil company, said 
fourth-quarter profit rose 27% to a record $10.7 billion on surging energy prices, capping the most profitable year 
for any company in U.S. history. (Bloomberg.com, 1/30/2006 and The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2005, pp. 
A1 and A3).  
6 Their standard deviations of their fd or fp are: %00.30/$ ±=euroσ , %05.33/$ ±=poundσ , %27.27/$ ±=yenσ , 
%58.18/ ±=europoundσ , %94.30/ ±=euroyenσ , %89.26/ ±=yenpoundσ . 
7 Muslim countries avoid to invest in U.S. assets after 2003 (invasion in Iraq) because they are afraid that the 
American government might freeze their funds. 
8  See, Kallianiotis (2004a and b). Here, we use ex post analysis; we do not forecast any variables. 
9  See, Neely and Weller (2002). 
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will be higher than the others and its risk to be the smallest one. Determining these assets with 
the highest return and lowest risk, the trend of the exchange rate of this specific country can be 
determined. An excess demand for the country’s assets will appreciate its currency.  
Some recent facts (“news”) reveal the effect of speculation on the different exchange 
rates. On Tuesday February 22, 2005, South Korea’s Central Bank announced that plans to 
diversify its foreign exchange reserves, which traders took to mean a slowdown in purchases of 
dollar-denominated securities. The U.S. dollar fell to $1.3259 per euro and lost value with 
respect the other major currencies, too. The DJIA slid 174.02 points (1.6%) as concerns about 
the weak dollar sparked a sell-off of the U.S. currency. Also, Gold surged $7.40 to $434.50 and 
oil climbed to $51.42 per barrel.10 In addition, terrorist attacks globally rose in 2004 to about 650 
from 175 in 2003, said congressional aides briefed by State Department and intelligence 
officials.11 A terrorist attack in London12 on July 7, 2005 caused stocks worldwide to fall; the 
London stocks (FTSE 100 index) fell by 200 points, the DJIA fell by 250 points, U.K. pound 
slumped to $1.7403 from $1.7556, bonds gained (10-year AAA=4.80%), oil in N.Y. fell by $5 to 
$57, and gold price increased by $4 to $430 per troy ounce; but after this shudder in the markets, 
they rebounded quickly. On Monday, October 3, 2005, Turkey “invaded” EU and we were 
expected to see some effects on euro, but nothing happened; it did not change at all.13 Then, 
invasions have no effect on exchange rates, only speculations do. Strange world and it is 
becoming worse every day! Economists and all social scientists will have a very hard time to 
analyze this fabricated anti-societal world.  On November 1, 2005, the FOMC raised the federal 
funds rate to 4% and instead of having an appreciation of the U.S. dollar, we had the opposite the 
exchange rate increased to 1.2067 $/euro.14  On December 13, 2005, Fed raised for 13th time in 
row the federal funds rate to 4.25% and instead of having an appreciation of the U.S. dollar, it 
fell to 1.2034 $/euro from 1.1668 $/euro that was on November 17, 2005.15 At the same time, we 
read that the U.S. net purchases of overseas stocks during the first 10 months were on a pace to 
smash the 2003 record of $88.6 billion. At an average of more than $9.5 billion a month, the 
2005 total could hit $115 billion.16 This huge demand for foreign financial assets causes the 
dollar to depreciate. On February 16, 2006, it has fallen to 1.1877 $/euro.17 
 Although a number of economic models have been used to interpret exchange rate 
movements, virtually none of the existing models can explain exchange rate behavior well 
because it is so much speculation and uncertainty in this market that make economic theories 
useless. Some economists attempt to interpret the phenomenon of deviation of the actual 
currency values from their fundamental values as speculative bubbles. Particularly, economic 
agents form their exchange rate expectations based on a certain kind of extrapolative behavior.18 
Thus, favorable changes in financial variables or in the investment environment may tend to 
generate an exchange rate appreciation that, in turn, may lead to expectations of a further 
                                                           
10 See, The Wall Street Journal, February 23, 2005, pp. A1, C1, C2, and C3; and “Dollar Declines as Bank of Korea 
Plans to Diversify Currency Reserves”, Bloomberg.com, 2/22/2005. 
11 See, The Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2005, p. A1. 
12 A group purporting to be the terrorist organization al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for explosions during morning 
rush hour across London. The public transportation system was shutting down. (Bloomberg.com, July 7, 2005 and 
The Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2005, p. C1). 
13 See, The Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2005, pp. A1, A15, and A16. 
14 See, The Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2005, p. A1 and Bloomberg.com, 11/2/2005. 
15 See, Bloomberg.com, 12/14/2005. 
16 See, The Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2005, pp. A1, C1, and C14. 
17 See, Bloomberg.com, 2/16/2006. 
18 See, Tucker, Madura, and Chiang (1991, p. 52). 
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appreciation. But, here, especially with the “euro”, there were no major changes in fundamentals. 
The above process continues as long as the market believes the currency price will persist 
moving in the same direction. Since the actual price moves farther away from the fundamentals 
as time passes, capital gains would have to be sufficiently large to compensate the risk of a 
bursting bubble, which it is not obvious for the euro at this moment. 
 Speculations and speculative bubbles have gained some empirical support in exchange 
rate determination literature. They were found in the DM/$ and FF/$ rates for the period June to 
October 1978. Evidence indicates that the German mark was overvalued with respect to its 
fundamental value by 12% and French franc by 11%.19 A speculative bubble was also found in 
the United States, where the dollar appreciated substantially for the period 1980 through 1985. 
The same seems to be the case with the Euro-zone; the euro has been appreciated without any 
changes in the fundamentals (except the Iraqi war and the fear of another war in Iran) since the 
beginning of 2003, reached 1.3646 $/euro on December 30, 2004 and continues to be 
overvalued.20 On October 6, 2005 it was 1.2129 $/euro21 and on January 23, 2006, it was 1.2280 
$/euro, which it is unjustifiable according to some researchers.22 On April 24, 2006, the 
Secretary of the State (Condoleezza Rice) visited Greece and Turkey asking for their support 
towards Iran. The dollar devaluated drastically from 1.2307 $/euro to 1.2596 $/euro.23The latest 
U.S. threats towards Iran caused the dollar to fall to 1.2740 $/euro.24 The Fed raised the Fed 
Funds rate to 5%, commercial banks raised their prime rate to 8%, the DJIA fell by -141.92 
points to 11,500.73, and the Gold jumped to $724.50, its highest close price since September 
1980, but the U.S. dollar depreciated to 1.2913 $/euro.25 The Michigan index of consumer 
sentiment decreased to 79 in May 2006.26 Why? The answer is: the global instability. The dollar 
was headed for its biggest weekly gain since November 2005 against the euro as Federal Reserve 
speakers suggested they will raise interest rates in June to keep inflation in check. Stock markets 
around the world plunged amid concern that rates are rising and growth is slowing.27 Today, 
their exchange rate is 1.2691 $/euro and the prime rates are: %25.8=USi , %00.3=EUi , 
%75.4=UKi , and %625.1=Ji .28 
 Meese and Rogoff (1983) conclude that exchange rate models do a poor job of tracking 
movements over short horizons. Then, the macroeconomic variables (money supply, income, 
interest rate, price level, debt, etc.) can explain changes in exchange rate over medium and long 
horizons. Currency traders, speculators, and other market participants who focus on the short-
term horizon look beyond macroeconomic models. They, search for signs (like risk and return) 
of short-term changes in the demand for currencies (assets denominated in specific currency), 
using any available measures of market transactions, behavior, and news. It is important for 
                                                           
19 See, Woo (1987). 
20 Euro was 0.8813 $/euro on December 31, 2001 and has been appreciated by 54.84% in three years. See, 
Kallianiotis (2005a and 2006b). 
21 Bloomberg.com (10/6/2005). 
22 Kallianiotis (2005b) is predicting an increase in the return on the U.S. T-Bills and an appreciation of the U.S. 
dollar, but here a new uncertainty appears for the world, the Iranian case. 
23 Bloomberg.com (4/20-28/2006). 
24 Bloomberg.com (5/5/2006) and Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2006, p. A1. 
25 Bloomberg.com (5/12/2006) and Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2006, p. A1. 
26 This index in April 2006 was 87.4. It is a drastic drop of consumers’ confidence. See, Bloomberg.com 
(5/12/2006). 
27 The U.S. dollar advanced to 1.2636 $/euro. (Bloomberg.com, 6/9/2006 and The Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2006, 
p. A1). 
28 The Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2006, pp. A1 and C12.  
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economists to model short-term exchange rate dynamics and determine (forecast) the future 
value of the different currencies. Speculators in the futures market are constantly interpreting 
public and private information about ongoing shifts in foreign currency demand as they develop 
their directional views.29  
 We start, in section 2, with the development of the return domestically and in a foreign 
country by considering the exchange rate risk, and an investment choice. In section 3, some 
empirical results are given for the four economies. In section 4, policy implications are discussed 
for currencies, which deviate from their fundamentals. Lastly, we conclude with a few comments 
on this analysis.  
 
2. Return, Exchange Rate Risk, and Investment Choice 
 
This analysis includes an international portfolio balance theory and its implications for 
exchange rates. A starting point is the hypothesis that real money demand depends not only on 
income, the conventional transactions variable, but also on interest rate and on wealth, the 
speculative demand.30 The internationalization of business and investment opportunities induce 
speculators to diversify their portfolios of assets denominated in a variety of currencies so that 
they can maximize their wealth ( tw ) and minimize its risk ( 2wσ ). Many times, we have 
experienced drastic effects on the value of currencies because these speculators decided to 
change overnight the content of their portfolios.31   
These shifts in wealth induced by current account imbalances or portfolio diversification 
create monetary imbalances leading to adjustments in long-run price level expectations and thus 
to exchange rate movements. With perfect mobility of capital, these specifications of money 
demand imply that the real money demand of a country with a surplus or acquiring its assets 
rises while it falls abroad. The relative price level of the country with a surplus or with a high 
demand of its assets declines and, therefore, exchange rates for given terms of trade tend to 
appreciate.  
The demand for monies is affected by an international redistribution of wealth. Portfolio 
effects can arise in the context of imperfect asset substitutability. With uncertain returns, 
portfolio diversification makes assets imperfect substitutes and gives rise to determinate 
demands for the respective securities and to yield differentials or a higher risk premium that one 
currency offers relative to the others. 
A portfolio model could provide an explanation of the unanticipated euro appreciation 
that is only poorly accounted for by speculation, prominent return in Euro-zone market,32 high 
                                                           
29  See, Klitgaard and Weir (2004). 





M εαααα ++−+= 3210 . 
31 In June 1997, the Asian currency crises started. The Thai baht devaluated in July, followed soon after by the 
Indonesian rupiah, Korean won, Malaysian ringgit, and Philippine peso. Following these initial exchange rate 
devaluations, Asian economies plummeted into recessions. The Indonesian president went public and blamed 
speculators (he named even one, George Soros) who shifted their short-term investments out of the country. Next 
day this poor president was forced to resign. See, Eiteman, Stonehill, and Moffett (2007, p. 44), Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), and Singal (1999). 
32 On September 20, 2006, at the meeting of the FOMC, the Fed left rates unchanged at 5.25% and the dollar fell 
with respect to euro, pound, and yen. The DJIA gained 72.28 points. (The Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2006, 
pp. A1, C1, and C2). 
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risk of holding U.S. dollar assets,33 future uncertainty, and global instability. The system of 
flexible exchange, the macroeconomic policies, the disturbances lately,34 and the new Iranian 
crisis have created an incentive for portfolio diversification, and that the euro will occupy a 
larger share in an efficiently diversified portfolio. The resulting portfolio shift or capital flows 
may account for some of the unanticipated appreciation of this new currency and not the EMU 
fundamentals. 
We would like to measure the returns of four investors (American, European, Briton, and 
Japanese) on assets denominated in four different currencies (dollar, euro, pound, and yen). The 
nominal short-term interest rate for a foreign investor must be as follows (with ex post 
calculation), depending whether the currency is at a forward discount or at a forward premium: 
 
e
tTSTS fpii tt += −−*          (1) 
or    etTSTS fdii tt −= −−*              (2) 
              
For a domestic investor, the same rate of interest is decomposed: 
 
ttTS ri t π+=−           (3) 
 
These equations can be expanded as, 
 
 )(* ttTSTS sfii tt −+= −−          (1’) 
 
or )(* ttTSTS sfii tt −−= −−             (2’) 
 
and  )( 1−− −+= tttTS ppri t             (3’) 
 
By lagging interest rates and exchange rates one period (avoiding their forecasting), we 
have an ex post measure of the nominal rate of return of an asset, 
 
 )( 11* 1 −−−− −+=− tttTSTS ssii t         (4) 
 
or  )( 11* 1 −−−− −−=− tttTSTS ssii t             (5) 
 
and )( 2111 −−−− −+=− tttTS ppri t             (6) 
 
 
where, iS-T=the nominal short-term interest rate (return), r= the real rate of interest, =the 
inflation rate, fd=the forward discount of the currency, fp=the forward premium, p=the ln of 
                                                           
33 Some “news” were: “Syrians’ funds will freeze in the U.S. banks”. (TV News, March 6, 2005). “Dollar declined 
as Bank of Korea plans to diversify currency reserves.” (Bloomberg.com, February 22, 2005). 
34 The U.S. Treasury reported the federal deficit hit a monthly record of $113.94 billion in February of 2005. 
Greenspan told the Council on Foreign Relations deficits pose a bigger risk to the U.S. than trade imbalances or low 
savings. (The Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2005, p. A1).  
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price index, s=the ln of spot exchange rate, f=the ln of forward exchange rate, “e” the expected 
value of the variable, and an asterisk denotes the foreign country. 
 Now, we take the utility function of an investor who wants to maximize his end-of-period 
real wealth (w) by investing on home ( JJBUKEEUAUS iiii ,,, )
35 and foreign ( **** ,,, IJIUKIEUIUS iiii )
36 
securities and to determine the optimal portfolio share of domestic and foreign securities 
( IJIUKIEUIUS xxxx ,,, ). 
 
Max ),( 2wwuU σ=             (7) 
 
where, U=the utility function, w =the mean of the end-of-period random wealth, and 2wσ =the 
variance of wealth, x=the optimal portfolio share (weights) on domestic and foreign securities 
(denominated in different foreign currencies), and I=investors (A, E, B, and J) investing in each 
one of these four countries (j=U.S., Euro-zone, Britain, and Japan). 
 The solution of eq. (7) will be to construct four different portfolio of four different assets 
( IJIUKIEUIUS iiii ,,, ) for four different investors (I: A=American, E=European, B=Briton, and 
J=Japanese), which will maximize their returns, E(RP), and minimize their risks, 2PRσ . Also, the 
calculation of the return to variability ratios (RVR) of these sixteen (4x4) investment 
opportunities can be measured, eq. (8), and invest in countries where the RVR is maximized. If 
investors would choose to invest in country j, due to high return and low risk, the high demand 






jiRVR σ=           (8) 
 
where, RVR=return to variability ratio, Iji =nominal return of asset j (in U.S., EU, U.K., and 
Japan) for investor I (American, European, Briton, and Japanese), and I
ji
σ =the standard 
deviation of the nominal return of asset j for investor I.  
The first step in evaluating the strength of any relationship between rate of return and 
exchange rates is to look for visual evidence. Plotting the levels of the rate of return against 
exchange rate levels reveals no obvious patterns. However, a fairly clear relationship emerges 
when looking at changes in the two variables. Knowing the change of the rate of return of a 
country would have allowed someone to guess correctly only the L-T direction of the U.S. dollar, 
the euro, the pound, and the yen. Tests show that movements of rate of return and its risk in one 
country anticipate how speculators change their demand and supply of assets denominated in this 
specific currency. The nature of exchange rate dynamics could argue about the contemporaneous 
relationship between return/risk and exchange rates and their future trends. 
Furthermore, currency market participants are heterogeneous and act on their own bits of 
private information, as well as on public information.37 Examples of private information include 
participants’ expectations of future economic variables, perceptions of public policy, perceptions 
                                                           
35 The variables Iji  can be calculated by using eqs. (3’) and (6).  
36 The variables *Iji  are calculated from eqs. (4) and (5). 
37  See, Evans and Lyons (2002). 
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of official and private sector demand, and perceptions of developing shifts in global liquidity and 
risk taking. Speculators act immediately in advance of exchange rate movements in a way that 
anticipates the direction of exchange rates and the rate of return. 
Our objective is to seek data to help us understand what is driving the exchange rate at any 
given time. Variables that are viewed as fundamental to dictating currency values (relative 
money supply, output, inflation rates, interest rate differentials, etc.) are constantly analyzed and 
forecast. Various transaction data are also examined to determine demand changes in different 
currencies. The results suggest that expected rate of return and risk in different countries merit 
inclusion in policy analysis and in ongoing research on exchange rate trend, its dynamics, and its 
determination. A long-term trend of the interest rate )( Iji  can be derived by using the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter38 (smoothed series, jII ), which is presented in eq. (9) below. Then, the 
exchange rate trend will follow the L-T trend of the rate of return. 



















j jIIjIIjIIjIIjIIi t λ       (9) 
 
The penalty parameter λ controls the smoothness of the series jII . The larger the λ , the smoother 
the jII . As ∞→λ , jII  approaches a linear trend. And jII  (j country’s return for an investor 
from country I) = USIA, USIE, USIB, USIJ; EUIE, etc. 
 
3. Empirical Results  
 
 So far, we have discussed the theoretical part of the rate of return and the risk of an asset 
denominated in different currencies. The current ex post analysis will measure the rate of return 
of a portfolio of four assets (U.S. T-bills, EU, U.K., and Japanese ones) in four currencies 
(dollar, euro, pound, and yen) and four investors (American, European, Briton, and Japanese) by 
considering the risk of the individual assets return, due to unanticipated exchange rate 
movements and other socio-economic fundamentals. The data, taken from economagic.com and 
imfstatistics.org, are monthly from 1999:01 to 2005:12. They comprise spot exchange rate, 
money supply (M2), consumer price index (CPI), federal funds rate, 3-month T-bill rate, prime 
rate, government bonds rate, real GDP, real risk-free rate of interest, risk premium (iGB-i3MTB), 
current account, unemployment rate, budget deficit, national debt, personal saving rate, price of 
gold, price of oil, and stock market index (DJIA) for these four countries. 
 Table 1 presents the six exchange rates [USEUS ($/euro), USUKS ($/pound), USJS 
($/yen), UKEUS (pound/euro), JEUS (yen/euro), and UKJS (pound/yen)]. The sample is divided 
into two sub-periods, from 1999:01-2001:12 (before the introduction of the euro-notes) and from 
2002:01-2005:12 (after the circulation of the euro-notes). Also, the sixteen rate of returns are 
calculated by taking into consideration the forward discount (fd) or premium (fp) of the 
currencies. The return for an American investor investing in EU was -3.76% and for a European 
investing in U.S. was 13.67%. The highest return was in the U.S., followed by U.K., Japan, and 
lastly the Euro-zone. During this period the dollar was at a premium; the pound at a discount 
with respect the dollar and the yen, and at a premium toward the euro; the euro was at a discount 
towards all the other currencies; the Japanese yen was at a discount with respect the dollar and at 
                                                           
38  See, Hodrick-Prescott (1997). 
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a premium with respect the euro and pound. After 2002, the highest return was in Euro-zone, 
following by U.K. and Japan. The worst return was in the U.S. (-6.12% for a European investing 
in the U.S.). The dollar was at a discount with respect all the other currencies; it was followed by 
the yen and the pound. The euro was at a premium with all the currencies. 
 Table 2 supplies a Granger causality test between the macro-variables (fundamentals) and 
the exchange rates. Between 1999 and 2001, the variables that caused changes in exchange rate 
in the U.S. were, inflation, real income growth, and real risk free rate of interest. In the EU, there 
were no variables causing the $/euro or the pound/euro exchange rates, only the yen/euro rate 
was caused by money growth, overnight rate, lending rate, risk premium, and unemployment. In 
the U.K., the T-bill rate and the risk premium were causing the $/pound rate; and the money 
growth and the current account were causing the pound/yen rate, but no variable was causing the 
pound/euro rate. In Japan, the risk premium and the current account were causing the $/yen rate; 
the risk premium, the current account, and the government bond were causing the yen/euro rate; 
the money supply, the risk free rate of interest, the government bond rate, the risk premium, and 
the current account are causing the pound/yen exchange rate. After 2002, in the U.S. there was 
no variable causing the $/euro exchange rate; it was the personal saving rate and the price of 
gold, which caused the $/pound rate; and the price of gold that caused the $/yen rate. In EU, no 
variable had caused the $/euro and the pound/euro exchange rates; only the lending rate caused 
the yen/euro rate. In the U.K., the T-bill, the government bond rate, the risk premium, and the 
price of gold caused the $/pound rate; also, the risk premium caused the pound/euro rate, but 
there was no variable to cause the pound/yen rate. In Japan, it was only the real GDP growth that 
caused the $/yen exchange rate and nothing else shown any causality for yen/euro or pound/yen 
exchange rates. 
 Table 3a gives the average return, standard deviation (risk) of the return, and the return to 
variability ratio. The highest return for this period was for %953.5=JUKi and the lowest for 
%515.0=BJi . The lowest risk is for a Japanese investor investing in Japanese T-bills 
( 159.0±=J
Ji
σ ), the highest risk was for the European investor investing in Japan ( 701.31±=E
Ji
σ ). 
The return to variability ratio ranks, first 969.11=JJi , second 095.6=BUKi , third 731.1=AUSi , and 
lastly 692.1=EEUi . 
 Table 3b presents the returns, risk, and the return to variability ratios from 1999:01 to 
2001:12. The highest return during this period was in the U.S. by a European investor 
( %683.13=EUSi ) and the lowest in the EU for an American investor ( %764.3−=AEUi ). The risk was 
smaller in Japan for a Japanese investor ( 093.0=J
Ji
σ ) and worst in Japan for a European investor 
( 000.41=E
Ji
σ ). The return to variability ratio ranks first Japan for investors (22.151%), second 
U.K. for Briton investors (8.995%), third U.S. for American investors, and lastly EU for 
European investors. The best country for foreign investors is the U.S., it is followed by U.K., 
Japan, and lastly the Euro-zone. This might be the reason that the U.S. dollar was appreciated 
during that period and the euro was losing value. 
 Table 3c reveals the return, risk, and return to variability ratio for these investments from 
2002:01 to 2005:12. During this period, the highest ratio was for Japanese investors investing in 
Japan. It follows by Britons investing in the U.K., then Europeans investing in the Euro-zone, 
and the worst Americans investing in the U.S. For foreigners, the highest return to variability 
ratios were in EU, following by the U.K., Japan, and the worst in the U.S. Then, the low return in 
the U.S. for Americans and the negative ones for Europeans, Britons, and Japanese made the 
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U.S. assets the least attractive and the U.S. dollar declined, due to its low demand by domestic 
and foreign investors. 
 Lastly, we did a smooth estimate of the long-term trend of the rate of return in the four 
different countries by using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter of eq. (9). The results are presented 
graphically in Figure 1. The first graph shows that the trend for the U.S. assets is positive and 
increasing. Then, investors will invest in the U.S. and the dollar will appreciate. The second 
graph points that the trend for foreign investors in EU is becoming negative and the euro will 
depreciate. The third one gives positive trend for Europeans, Japanese, and Britons investing in 
U.K. assets, but negative for Americans investing there. Then, the results for the pound are 
mixed. The last graph displays flat slopes for Europeans, Britons, and Japanese investing in 
Japan and negative slopes for Americans investing in that country. Then, the Japanese yen is not 
expected to appreciate. 
 Since the introduction of the euro, the correlation coefficients are very high for the 
following rates: 972.0/$,/$ +=poundeuroρ  , 911.0/,/ +=euroyeneuropoundρ , and 949.0/,/ −=euroyenyenpoundρ . 
On the other hand, the correlation coefficients are very small for the following exchange rates: 
248.0/$,/ +=yeneuropoundρ , 052.0/$,/ +=yeneuroyenρ , and 146.0/,/$ +=yenpoundyenρ . Then, when the U.S. 
dollar is depreciated, the euro and pound are appreciated; and when the euro is appreciated, the 
pound and yen are depreciated. Lastly, when the yen is appreciated, the pound and the euro are 
depreciated.      
  
4. Policy Implications of Currencies deviated from their Fundamentals 
 
 Even though that the U.S. dollar has depreciated drastically since 2001 (i.e., -52.66% 
with respect to euro),39 the current account deficits have assumed extraordinary proportions.40 A 
current account deficit is matched by a capital account surplus. In other words, a country with a 
current account deficit surrenders claims on future income (physical assets, stocks, and bonds) to 
foreigners. The ongoing U.S. current account deficit translates into an average of billions dollars 
in net capital imports per business day. That is, foreign investors have been accumulating U.S. 
assets at an unusually high rate. Foreign investors might become wary of holding increasingly 
larger portions of their wealth in U.S. assets. In order to promote continued investment in the 
United States, U.S. assets would then have to become more attractive. One way of attracting 
foreign investments is to lower the price of the asset in foreign currency terms. A decline in the 
foreign exchange value (depreciation) of the dollar would do just that. Therefore, a large current 
account deficit might be expected to depress the value of the dollar over time.  
 A reasonable question arises now; but, what about the persistent current account deficit? 
Indispensably, trade policies must improve it and citizens must make their demands for imports 
more elastic )1( >Mε for their own good (personal interest) and their country’s benefits. The 
following identity holds for an economy, 
 
MXISGTEY −=−+−=−          (10) 
 
                                                           
39  See, Kallianiotis (2006b, Table 2). 
40 Trade deficit in U.S. widened to a record in 2005 reaching $726 billion, even though that the U.S. dollar was 
depreciated. (Bloomberg.com, 2/10/2006). In 2006, from January to July, the trade deficit was $453 billion, $55 
billion more comparing with the same period in 2005. (Cencus.gov, 9/22/2006).    
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where, Y=income (GDP), E=expenditures, T=taxes, G=government spending, S=saving, 
I=investment, X=exports, and M=imports. 
 If (X-M<0) in the above eq. (10), a devaluation might improve this current account 
deficit. But, a necessary and sufficient condition (Marshall-Lerner) must hold, 
 
1* >+ MM εε            (11) 
 
where, Mε  =the domestic price elasticity of the demand for imports and *Mε =the foreign price 
elasticity of demand for their imports. 
 Then, the process could be as follows (if Marshall-Lerner condition holds): 
 
↓⇒↓↑⇒↑↓⇒↑⇒↑⇒ CADSsalespromotetoiandPSEXKASCAD assetsassetsassets )($)()()(  
 
where, CAD=current account deficit and KAS=capital account surplus. 
 
 The current account and capital account are two sides of the same coin. A country that is 
running a current account deficit )( GoodsGoods XM > is necessarily also running a capital account 
surplus )( AssetsFinancialAssetsFinancial MX > . Foreign-owned assets in the United States increased from 
less than $2.5 trillion in 1990 to over $10 trillion by the end of 2003. Today, they must be in the 
area of $12 trillion, due to widened trade deficits.41 Over the same period, U.S.-owned assets 
abroad increased from $2.3 trillion to nearly $7.9 trillion.42  
 Even though that the return was lower in the U.S., investors invest here, because of the 
unparalleled efficiency, stability, transparency, certainty, and liquidity of the U.S. financial 
markets. Investors find that dollar-denominated claims are an attractive element of any 
international portfolio. This process of investors seeking the most beneficial combination of risk 
and return, rebalancing portfolio when opportunities arise, gives rise to a source of capital 
account dynamics that is unrelated in any direct way to the pattern of trade in goods and services. 
Figure 1 shows a smoothing of the series (the four returns in U.S., in Euro-zone, in U.K., and 
Japan that domestic and foreign investors face) by using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter to 
obtain a smooth estimate of the long-term components of the series ( Iji ’s). The graphs reveal that 
the L-T returns are increasing for all investors investing in the U.S. financial assets. Then, this 
excess demand for U.S. assets, due to high returns and the tremendous current account deficit in 
the U.S. will appreciate the U.S. dollar, relative to the other three currencies.43   
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
 The objective of this ex post analysis is to determine the exchange rates (their L-T trend) 
for four different countries (U.S., Euro-zone, England, and Japan). Since 2003:01, the U.S. dollar 
is losing value with respect the euro and other major currencies of the world and we want to see 
                                                           
41 See, www.bloomberg.com, 2/10/2006. 
42  See, Pakko (2004). 
43 The recent exchange rate confirms these predictions; the spot rate fell to S = 1.1877 $/euro on February 16, 2006. 
(Bloomberg.com, 2/16/2006). But, the Israeli invasion in Lebanon (Summer 2006) with its tremendous destruction 
of that country and the thousands of war refugees imposed on Cyprus, a plan since 1902, according to historians, 
and the current Iranian crisis changed the predicted results, due to this growing global instability. 
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if this depreciation depends on economic fundamentals (lower return in the U.S. and higher risk 
and on the other macroeconomic variables) or it is just speculation from individuals and 
countries, which hold large amounts of foreign assets denominated in different currencies or due 
to the current global instability. The preliminary conclusion from this ex post analysis is, here, 
that, international investors are investing in countries with higher return and lower risk 
(exchange rate risk and political risk). This increase in demand for these assets increases the 
demand for currency in that country and its currency is appreciated. Before 2001, people were 
invested in the U.S. and Japan, so the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen were appreciated. After 
2001, they invested in Euro-zone and the U.K. and the dollar and yen lost their value. The 
exchange rate data confirm this relationship between the smooth estimates of the rate of return 
and currency values. Of course, due to high risk (wars and creeping ones and political conflicts) 
and low returns many speculators have invested in euros and other currencies, instead in dollars 
denominated assets. Historically, the American government has frozen the foreign assets inside 
the U.S. when a conflict arises. The L-T smoothing of these returns shows that they are growing 
in the U.S and in England, and are declining for Americans investing in the other three countries 
and for other international investors, so the demand for U.S. investment will increase and the 
U.S. dollar is expected to appreciate in the future. Investors know what is going on globally and 
act accordingly, so speculators take advantage of this knowledge. Already, the current data show 
this trend; the dollar from S = 1.3646 $/euro (12/30/2004) had reached S = 1.1877 $/euro 
(2/16/2006).44 Now, with the new Iranian crisis (global instability) the dollar started losing value. 
 Finally, by constructing a portfolio of different assets, we can maximize the utility 
function of a speculator by maximizing his return and minimizing his risk. From these returns 
and risk or the return to variability ratio (RVR), we can conclude if the currency will appreciate 
or not. High expected return on assets denominated in dollar means that dollar is expected to 
appreciate. The empirical results are supporting this argument before the 2001 and after. But, the 
preliminary tests show that economic fundamentals have less effect on exchange rates, lately; 
then, exchange rates depend mostly on speculation, due to the expected risk (uncertainty) and 
return. The paper needs some more data and an ex ante analysis (forecasting) of the returns and 
risks for all the major countries involved in the global trade (or an exchange rate index of the 
dollar with respect the major currencies) and more statistical and portfolio analysis to give better 
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Table 1 
Spot Exchange Rates, Rates of Return, Natural Logarithms, and Forward Discounts or Premiums 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1999:01-2005:12)     (1999:01-2001:12)     (2002:01-2005:12) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 S  Sσ  s  sσ  fd (+) fdσ  S  Sσ  s  sσ  fp (-) fpσ  S  Sσ  s  sσ  fd (+) fdσ  
USEUS 1.069 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.52 30.00 0.956 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -9.01 30.34 1.146 0.13 0.13 0.12 7.06 28.22  
USUKS 1.628 0.15 0.48 0.09 0.78 22.05 1.521 0.08 0.42 0.05 -4.63 19.70 1.701 0.14 0.53 0.09 4.49 22.98 
USJS 0.009 0.01 -4.74 0.07 -0.48 27.27 0.009 0.01 -4.74 0.06 -4.08 30.47 0.009 0.01 -4.74 0.07 1.98 24.86 
UKEUS 0.654 0.03 -0.43 0.05 -0.26 18.58 0.628 0.02 -0.47 0.04 -4.38 20.90 0.672 0.03 -0.40 0.04 2.57 16.43 
JEUS 122.05 13.99 4.80 0.12 1.00 30.94 109.28 10.55 4.69 0.09 -4.94 40.99 130.82 8.04 4.87 0.06 5.07 21.05 
UKJS 0.005 0.01 -5.22 0.07 -1.26 26.89 0.006 0.01 -5.16 0.06 0.56 33.89 0.005 0.01 -5.27 0.03 -2.51 21.09 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(1999:01-2005:12)     (1999:01-2001:12)     (2002:01-2005:12) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Iji  Ijiσ  pfordf  fporfdσ   Iji  Ijiσ  pfordf  fporfdσ   Iji  Ijiσ  pfordf  fporfdσ  
A
USi  3.05 1.76     4.67 1.23     1.69 0.80   
E
USi  2.53 30.59 0.52  30.00  13.67 30.50 -9.01  30.34  -6.12 29.21 7.81  28.99 
B
USi  2.27 22.64 0.78  22.05  9.30 19.95 -4.63  19.70  -3.59 23.91 5.29  23.68 
j
USi  3.53 27.56 -0.48  27.27  8.75 30.39 -4.08  30.47  -1.05 25.09 2.74  24.86 
E
EUi  3.37 1.99     5.25 1.40     1.94 0.87 
A
EUi  3.91 30.00 -0.52  30.00  -3.76 30.24 9.01  30.34  9.75 28.77 -7.81  28.99 
B
EUi  2.91 18.85 0.26  18.58  0.87 20.98 4.38  20.90  4.46 17.12 -2.52  17.17 
J
EUi  4.12 31.51 -1.00  30.94  0.31 40.80 4.94  40.99  7.01 22.09 -5.07  22.11 
B
UKi  4.57 0.75     5.20 0.58     4.09 0.46 
A
UKi  5.30 22.26 -0.78  22.05  0.57 19.59 4.63  19.70  9.37 23.61 -5.29  23.68 
E
UKi  5.05 19.08 -0.26  18.58  9.58 20.89 -4.38  20.90  1.56 17.23 2.52  17.17 
J
UKi  5.95 27.39 -1.26  26.89  4.64 33.83 0.56  33.89  6.63 21.89 -2.55  21.88 
J
Ji  1.90 0.16     2.06 0.09     1.79 0.07 
A
Ji  1.25 27.58 0.48  27.27  -2.02 30.47 4.08  30.47  4.53 24.88 -2.74  24.86 
E
Ji  1.00 31.70 1.00  30.94  7.00 41.00 -4.94  40.99  -3.28 22.10 5.07  22.11 
B
Ji  0.52 27.45 1.26  26.89  2.62 33.89 -0.56  33.89  -0.76 21.88 2.55  21.88 
 
Note:  See, Table 2. 
Source: Economic Time Series Page by Eveline Tainer at http://www.economagic.com and hhtp://www.imfstatistics.org.  
   
Table 2 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests (1999:01-2001:12) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SX =>   m  π  FFi  RFi  Pi  GBi  q  *r  RP LCA u LND psr L GoldP  L oilP  LDJIA 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
U.S. 
S ($/euro) 0.207 3.460** 0.243 0.093 0.529 0.260 1.364 3.313** 0.033 0.610 0.824 1.659 0.403 2.135 0.113 0.506  
S ($/pound) 0.601 3.356** 0.832 0.540 1.382 0.026 2.223 2.404 0.596 0.297 0.475 1.704 0.199 1.524 0.820 0.345  
S ($/yen) 1.784 0.006 1.913 1.861 1.408 0.971 4.764** 0.023 0.815 0.602 0.400 0.812 0.435 0.686 2.185 0.293 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
EU 
S ($/euro) 0.097 2.057 0.314 0.538 0.868 0.101 0.963 0.894 0.334 0.627 0.728 - - 2.135 0.113 -    
S (pound/euro) 0.623 1.619 0.926 0.173 1.070 0.107 0.335 1.536 0.644 1.182 1.507 - - 1.091 1.194 -  
S (yen/euro) 2.973* 1.140 2.911* 0.516 4.285** 1.248 1.990 1.048 2.993* 0.390 3.652** - - 0.256 0.869 - 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
U.K. 
S ($/pound)  0.901 0.782 - 2.569* - 2.481 1.086 0.530 6.073*** 0.279 0.332 - - 1.524 0.820 -  
S (pound/euro) 1.179 2.382 - 0.228 - 0.120 1.196 2.353 0.048 0.062 1.925 - - 1.091 1.194 -    
S (pound/yen) 2.864* 0.129 - 0.343 - 1.319 1.344 0.154 0.049 4.080** 2.419 - - 0.004 0.923 -  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
J 
S ($/yen)  1.138 0.491 - 1.504 - 1.914 1.422 0.507 3.099* 3.131* 0.916 - - - - -  
S (yen/euro) 2.230 0.961 - 2.076 - 3.251* 1.380 1.018 5.610*** 8.011*** 0.688 - - - - -     














Table 2 (continued) 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests (2002:01-2005:12) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SX =>   m  π  FFi  RFi  Pi  GBi  q  *r  RP LCA u LND psr L GoldP  L oilP  LDJIA 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
U.S. 
S ($/euro) 0.133 0.545 0.483 1.576 0.486 1.098 0.003 0.472 1.403 0.017 1.377 1.165 0.481 1.682 0.466 1.061 
S ($/pound) 0.431 0.700 0.527 2.392 0.516 1.446 0.591 0.523 2.045 0.557 0.630 0.621 2.651* 3.700** 0.535 0.138  
S ($/yen) 0.510 0.287 0.451 1.990 0.511 1.366 0.790 0.340 1.148 0.262 1.646 0.160 0.936 2.937* 0.205 0.076 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
EU 
S ($/euro) 0.126 0.016 0.492 0.817 0.211 1.439 0.793 0.179 0.579 0.231 0.398 - - 0.843 0.467 -    
S (pound/euro) 0.121 1.318 0.860 0.087 0.068 1.133 0.692 1.632 1.007 0.936 0.314 - - 0.440 0.487 -   
S (yen/euro) 1.090 1.008 1.153 0.414 2.731* 0.541 1.290 0.979 0.715 0.965 1.311 - - 0.798 0.560 -  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
U.K. 
S ($/pound)  2.061 0.392 - 2.514* - 3.621** 1.182 0.616 3.644** 2.288 0.612 - - 3.700** 0.535 -  
S (pound/euro) 0.059 1.510 - 0.427 - 1.616 1.752 1.562 2.440* 0.948 0.579 - - 0.440 0.487 -     
S (pound/yen) 1.778 0.764 - 0.894 - 0.035 0.500 0.764 0.321 0.292 0.164 - - 0.070 0.357 - 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
J 
S ($/yen)  0.075 0.665 - 0.321 - 0.112 2.984* 0.664 0.110 2.201 0.605 - - - - -   
S (yen/euro) 0.389 0.161 - 0.158 - 2.143 0.467 0.161 2.123 0.141 1.297 - - - - -     
S (pound/yen) 0.096 0.002 - 0.007 - 1.028 0.953 0.002 1.029 0.350 0.046 - - - - - 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: USEUS=dollar/euro spot exchange rate ($/euro), USUKS=dollar/pound spot ($/pound), USJS=dollar/yen spot ($/yen), UKEUS=pound/euro spot (pound/euro), JEUS=yen/euro spot 
rate (yen/euro), UKJS=pound/yen spot exchange rate (pound/yen), S =the mean spot rate, s =the mean of the ln S, Sσ =the standard deviation, fd=the forward discount, fp=the forward 
premium, AUSi =US interest rate for an American, 
E
USi =US interest rate for an European, 
B
USi =US interest rate for a Briton, 
j
USi =US interest for a Japanese, 
E
EUi =EU interest for a European, 
A
EUi =EU interest for an American, 
B
EUi =EU interest for a Briton, 
J
EUi =EU interest for a Japanese, 
B
UKi =UK interest for a Briton, 
A
UKi =UK interest for an American, 
E
UKi =UK interest for a 
European,  JUKi =UK interest for a Japanese,  
J
Ji =Japanese interest for a Japanese investor, 
A
Ji =Japanese interest for an American, 
E
Ji =Japanese interest for a European, and 
B
Ji =Japanese for 
a Briton; SX =>  = X causes S , S =the growth of the spot exchange rate, Numbers are F-Statistics, *** =significant at the 1% level, **= significant at the 5% level, and *=  
significant at the 10% level. 
Source: See, Table 1. 
 
 
Table 3a  
Investments in U.S., Euro-zone, U.K., and Japanese Assets: 
 Return, Risk, and Return to Variability Ratio (1999:01-2005:12) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 | AUSi  EUSi  BUSi  JUSi  
E
EUi  AEUi  BEUi  JEUi  BUKi  AUKi  EUKi  JUKi  
J
Ji  AJi  EJi  BJi  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
x  | 3.050 2.534 2.274 3.533 3.371 3.912 2.911 4.117 4.565 5.301 5.053 5.953 1.903 1.251 1.004 0.515  
xσ  | 1.762 30.591 22.638 27.563 1.992 29.997 18.848 31.513 0.749 22.264 19.076 27.388 0.159 27.584 31.701 27.454 
x
xi
σ  | 1.731 0.083 0.100 0.128 1.692 0.130 0.154 0.131 6.095 0.238 0.265 0.217 11.969 0.045 0.032 0.019 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3b 
Investments in U.S., Euro-zone, U.K., and Japanese Assets: 
 Return, Risk, and Return to Variability Ratio (1999:01-2001:12) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 | AUSi  EUSi  BUSi  JUSi  
E
EUi  AEUi  BEUi  JEUi  BUKi  AUKi  EUKi  JUKi  
J
Ji  AJi  EJi  BJi  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
x  | 4.672 13.683 9.304 8.748 5.248 -3.764 0.869 0.312 5.199 0.567 9.578 4.642 2.060 -2.015 6.996 2.617  
xσ  | 1.231 30.495 19.947 30.385 1.398 30.244 20.982 40.801 0.578 19.593 20.892 33.829 0.093 30.475 41.000 33.893 
x
xi
σ  | 3.795 0.449 0.466 0.288 3.754 -0.124 0.041 0.008 8.995 0.029 0.458 0.137 22.151 -0.066 0.171 0.077 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3c 
Investments in U.S., Euro-zone, U.K., and Japanese Assets: 
 Return, Risk, and Return to Variability Ratio (2002:01-2005:12) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 | AUSi  EUSi  BUSi  JUSi  
E
EUi  AEUi  BEUi  JEUi  BUKi  AUKi  EUKi  JUKi  
J
Ji  AJi  EJi  BJi  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
x  | 1.692 -6.117 -3.595 -1.048 1.943 9.752 4.465 7.012 4.086 9.372 1.564 6.633 1.789 4.529 -3.280 -0.758  
xσ  | 0.797 29.211 23.905 25.089 0.869 28.774 17.124 22.086 0.459 23.610 17.226 21.887 0.068 24.881 22.104 21.878 
x
xi
σ  | 2.123 -0.209 -0.150 -0.042 2.236 0.339 0.261 0.317 8.902 0.397 0.091 0.303 26.309 0.182 -0.148 -0.035 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Note: See, Tables 1 and 2; S  = growth of the U.S $/euro exchange rate ( ↓↑⇒ $S ), and 
x
xi
σ = the return to variability ratio. 






Smooth Estimate of the L-T Trend of the Rates of Return in the U.S., the Euro-zone, the U.K., and in Japan: 
(Hodrick-Prescott Filter) 
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Note: USIA ( AUSi )=the U.S. interest rate (nominal return) for an American investor, USIE( EUSi )=the U.S. return for a European 
investor, USIB ( BUSi )=the U.S. return for a Briton investor, and USIJ ( JUSi )=the U.S. return for a Japanese investor, EUIE 
( EEUi )=the Euro-zone interest rate (nominal return) for a European investor, EUIA ( AEUi )=the Euro-zone return for an 
American investor, EUIB( BEUi )=the Euro-zone return for a Briton investor, and EUIJ ( JEUi )=the U.S. return for a Japanese 
investor, UKIB ( BUKi )=the U.K. interest rate (nominal return) for a Briton investor, UKIA ( AUKi )=the U.K. return for an 
American investor, UKIE ( EUKi )=the U.K. return for a European investor, and UKIJ ( JUKi )=the U.K. return for a Japanese 
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 American investor, JIE ( EJi )=the Japanese return for a European investor, and JIB ( BJi )=the Japanese return for a Briton 
investor,  HPTREND=the Hodrick-Prescott filter, which shows a smooth estimate of the long-term trend of the interest rate. 
Source: Economic Time Series Page by Eveline Tainer at http://www.economagic.com and hhtp://www.imfstatistics.org, and Kallianiotis 
(2006a).  
 
